Miller said in the conference in which he presented the theme for the upcoming congress, “[...] analysing the parlêtre is no longer quite the same thing as analysing the unconscious in Freud’s sense, nor even the unconscious structured like a language”.

J.-A. Miller distinguishes three different unconscious in this sentence:

1) the Freudian unconscious and its formations: the joke, the lapsus and dreams,

2) the first Lacanian unconscious linked to language and the signifier where the symptom is defined as a metaphor and

3) the real unconscious of the parlêtre. An order derived from a reading of Lacan’s texts to the letter.

The psychoanalysis that Freud invented is not the same one that Lacan reveals at the end of his teaching, nor does Lacan repeat his first Seminars. His fidelity to the Freudian text permitted him to establish a non-Freudian apparatus with which he could adequately work Freud’s texts.

But is knowing the theoretical differences between these unconscious enough to understand what is involved in analysing the parlêtre?
In Freud’s sense, dreams were the royal road to the unconscious, whereas Lacan at the end of his teaching indicated another path, the symptom as an invention, aiming at the hidden jouissance.

This change also affects the concept of the subject. Currently, it is thought of as the individual and his body. Is this the definition of the parlêtre? It is rather understanding what “concerns [...] the most singular in the subject, not as a subjective statute, but rather a symptom and a certain conjunction and disjunction between the signifier and the jouissance”[1].

When analysing the parlêtre, the interpretation has to follow the model of a mathematical formulation, the only way to reach the real, focusing on “it wants to enjoy” instead of “it wishes to say”. To achieve this, the interpretation should aim at a reduction to “it does not say anything”; rather than concentrating on meaning, it should go against all meaning. In this aspect, the interpretation is closer to the written than the word[2]. In addition, the manoeuvres in transference allow for the intervention by an act, cutting the session, the equivocle leading to the unequivocal, which is precisely taking things against meaning, hoping to perturb the defence.

Translated from the Spanish by Alejandro Betancur Velez